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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is correct pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j).

Statement of Issues
Is there a breach of contract when one party (B) commits intentional torts
against the other party (A), injuring party A's right to enjoyment of the
contract?
Is there a breach of good faith and fair dealing when one party (B) commits
intentional tort upon intentional tort against the other party (A), injuring
party A's right to enjoyment of the contract?
Is not the duty to abide by the laws of the land so as to not interfere with a
person's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract implicit in any contract?
Does not the trial court's holding - that a party to a contract can break the
laws of the land to interfere with a contract, simply because the contract
does not forbid it - set a dangerous precedent?
3

Standard of Review
Standard of Review for each issue is set forth in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp.:
When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colman
v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v.
Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). In light of the
standard of review, we state the facts in a light most favorable to the
party against which the rule 12(b)(6) motion was brought. See State v.
Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). Because the propriety of a
12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling
no deference [**3] and review it under a correctness standard. Lowe,
779 P.2d at 669 (citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 131 P.2d
225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985)).

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement."
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Statement of the Case
I. Nature of the Case
This is a breach of contract case arising out of appellee's commission
of intentional torts against appellant, injuring appellant's right to enjoyment
of the contract. The injury and suffering arising out of the commission of
said torts has become so great that appellant maintains a breach of contract
exists.
II. Course of proceedings
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
III. Trial Court Disposition
Trial court gave the motion to dismiss to the appellee stating the
contract did not forbid appellee from committing torts against appellant and
reasoned that a contract can not be enlarged to included terms not included
in the original contract.
Trial court referred to the torts as "harassment" by the appellee's
police and completely overlooked the other torts committed by the nonpolice in arriving at its decision.
Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to amend the
complaint. Neither were allowed.
IV. Statement of Facts
5

Appellant is an alumnus of BYU.
Starting in 1993 appellant was subjected to questionable and harassing
treatment by appellee's BYU police.
Appellant was subsequently subjected to a false arrest in 1997 which
was admitted to be false by its general counsel. Appellant sued. Appellee
settled agreeing to allow appellant to sign up and take 10 classes for free
during spring and summer term over a 10 year period.

That said contract

(Appendix A) exists is not in dispute.
Despite the court settlement and assurances from appellee that the
conduct of the BYU police would cease, the conduct did not cease. Said
conduct towards of the BYU police is motivated by ill-will.
Subsequent to the court settlement, appellee continued to commit torts
against appellant in the form of two (2) defamatory articles published by the
school newspaper, the first admittedly was a fabricated police beat story of
and concerning appellant wherein the police told the student body and other
readers, without basis, to "use caution" around appellant. The VP of student
life required a retraction article to be published 3 months later.
The second defamatory article stated appellant had been convicted of
criminal trespassing which was false.
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Appellee's police detained, in violation of the 4

and 14

amendments, appellant on numerous occasion without cause on and off
campus.
Appellant returned to BYU as a student spring '02. The latter 2 false
imprisonments occurred when appellant was a student attending class at
BYU during 2002.
The BYU police supervise the security guards and showed them a
picture of appellant and told them to report him on sight. One student
security guard obliged and the police came and detained (false imprisoned)
appellant. This occurred in spite of the fact that appellant was a student
there and had done nothing illegal. (Walking through the hall of an open
building)
Subsequently, police issued an advisory to the chemistry building to
report appellant on site and appellant was false imprisoned, not being
allowed to leave, until the officer called to the scene spoke at length with the
appellant. This occurred despite the fact appellant was a student there and
despite the appellant not having violated any rule or law.
Further, it was frustrating to the appellant to have to be subjected to
the torts, said injury resulting from these torts being complicated by the
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memory of the false arrest and sexual assault on appellant. Moreover, the
police specifically singled appellant out for these false imprisonments.
The most blatant abuse heaped upon appellant while a student there
was when a security guard, supervised by the BYU police, approached a
classmate in appellant's Computer Science 460 class spring 2002, said
classmate being a former roommate and friend, and began telling classmate
ten things that police dispatch read to him concerning appellant, each item
being confidential and sensitive information generally not given out without
a specialized request.

Said information was highly damaging to the

friendship of appellant and former roommate and was extremely upsetting to
say the least. It interfered with appellants coursework, ability to study, and
appellant was so upset he could not take the final exam in the same room
with the former roommate and ended up taking the exam 2 hrs. prior to the
final exam by permission of the professor. Subsequently, former roommate
would not work in the same lab as appellant.
Appellant believes that the police are singling him out for such
treatment and likely is due to the settlement that vindicated appellant in the
false arrest incident.
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Appellant was so shook up by the incidents along with the long
history of abuse by the appellee towards him that he maintains a breach of
good faith and fair dealing in contract exists.

Summary of the Argument
Appellant's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract was injured by the
appellees's intentional torts against Appellant, and the criteria outlined in for
breach of good faith and fair dealing in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp. is satisfied.

Detail of the Argument
I. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Criteria
The criteria for a breach of good faith and fair dealing is set forth in
St. Benedict's Dev. Co.:
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most,
if not all, contractual relationships. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). ... Under the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not
intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. Bastian v.
Cedar Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981);
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979). A violation of the
covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. Beck, 701 P.2d at
798.
St. Benedict's Dev. Co., at 200.
It appears then that a breach of good faith and fair dealing occurs
when a 1) party to a contract 2) (a) intentionally or (b) purposely does
9

anything which will 3) (a) destroy or (b) injure 4) the other party's right 5) to
receive the fruits of the contract. St. Benedict's Dev. Co., at 200. Each of
these are in turn analyzed in light of the facts of the case at bar.
II. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Criteria applied to the instant case
A. Party to a Contract
Appellee is a party to a contract at center of this case. See Appendix
A - Settlement Agreement.
B. Intentionally or purposely does anything
The torts committed by the appellee against appellant are intentional
acts. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) False Imprisonment fflj 28 (a),
(c); 29 (b), (c); Defamation ffif 13-20,22-26 ; Breach of Confidentiality ffif
31-33; Civil Rights Violations ffif 28 (a), (c); 29 (b), (c) , 13-20, 22-26, 3133; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act violations <[fl| 22-26, 31-33;
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fflf 13-20, 22-26, 31-33. See
Complaint (Appendix B) False Imprisonment f 29 (b), (c); Defamation

^

13-21,22-26 ; Breach of Confidentiality If 31-33; Civil Rights Violations ffi[
29 (b), (c), 13-20, 22-26, 31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act
violations | | 22-26, 31-33; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fflf
13-20, 22-26, 31-33. See also Prosser, Wade & Schwartz's, Torts, 10th
edition, (2001) (false imprisonment is an intentional tort, Id. pp. 37-47;
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defamation (an intentional tort and libel per se as alleged in the
complaint/amended complaint; defamation requires a purposeful act) is a
tort, Id. pp. 833-936; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Id. pp. 4763; breach of confidentiality (as alleged in the complaint/amended
complaint) resulted from purposeful acts, Id. pp. 954-958).
Additionally, appellant has alleged these acts were intentional. See
Amended Complaint (Appendix D) ^[ 43-47; See Complaint (Appendix B)
1H 43-47.
C. Which will destroy or injure
Torts injure. The word tort derives from (in part) the French word
tort, which means injury or wrong. Torts, id at p. 1. Appellant has alleged
that the torts committed by the appellee have indeed injured appellant. See
Amended Complaint (Appendix D) fflf 7, 8, 21, 26, 32-33, 35, 37; See
Complaint (Appendix B)fflf7, 8, 21, 26, 32-33, 35, 37.
In injuring appellant, his right to enjoy the contract is injured.
D. The other party's
Appellant is the other party to the contract.
Settlement Agreement.
E. Right to receive the fruits of the contract
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See Appendix A -

Being party to the contract appellant has a right to receive the fruits of
the contract.
The fruits of the contract in this case is the right to attend appellee's
place of business for educational purposes free from injury caused by torts
being committed against him by appellee.

The academic environment

requires some degree of solitude and should be a place where a student can
concentrate on their studies free from torts and the fear of torts being
committed upon them.
Appellant argues that obedience to the laws of the land so as to not
interfere with a party's enjoyment of the contract is implicit in every
contract. The trial court, in its Ruling (Appendix C) and , implicitly has held
that a party to a contract can break the laws of the land - when such language
to prohibit the breaking the laws of the land is not explicitly in the contract and can break the laws of the land as such to get out of the contract. Such a
holding is unwise. (The trial court was able to do this by characterizing the
torts as harassment - discussed below)
Appellant has been defamed by appellee on two occasions which
damaged his reputation among the student body and faculty, caused
emotional distress and injured and damaged the fruits of the contract and the
enjoyment thereof.
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Appellant has been singled of by appellee's police for false
imprisonment on numerous occasions. This has injured the right to benefit
from the contract as Appellant does not want to suffer tort against him
simply by being on campus.
Appellant has had violation of confidentiality committed by a security
guard who works under the police approaching a classmate, former
roommate and friend in a computer lab and beginning a character attack on
appellant, highly disrupting appellant's ability to study and succeed in his
schoolwork.
Appellant's right to the benefits of the contract has therefore been
injured.
III. Acts of the appellee constitute torts
A. False Imprisonment
False Imprisonment occurs when a defendant intentionally confines
another person against their wishes and the person being confined is aware
of the confinement.
Appellant was confined against his wishes by appellee and was aware
of the confinement. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) %% 29 (b), (c);
See Complaint (Appendix B) | f 29 (b), (c).
Appellee had no legal basis for the false imprisonment.
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B. Defamation
Defamation occurs when a defendant publishes false information to
another, of and concerning the plaintiff, tending to cause damage to the
reputation of the plaintiff.
Appellant was defamed by a fabricated police beat article printed in
appellee's newspaper. Said article was of and concerning appellant, was
false, and tended to damage the reputation of the appellant. See Amended
Complaint (Appendix D) fflj 13-20; See Complaint (Appendix B) fflf 13-20.
When a student's reputation is damaged in the eyes of fellow peers it harms
the educational experience.
Appellant was defamed (libel per se) in an internet article printed by
appellee's newspaper stating appellant had been convicted for criminal
trespassing when in fact he had not been.

See Amended Complaint

(Appendix D)ffi[22-26; See Complaint (Appendix B)fflj22-26.
C. Breach of Confidentiality
Breach of Confidentiality is actionable at common law. See Prosser,
Wade & Schwartz's, Torts, 10th edition, (2001) p. 954.
Appellant had confidential information (police information, school
disciplinary information) given out to a classmate and former roommate and
friend with no legal basis for so doing and against governmental and school
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policy. Said information being given out injured appellant. See Amended
Complaint (Appendix D)ffl[31-33; See Complaint (Appendix B)ffl[31-33.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires four elements:
(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
(2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) There must be a casual connection between the wrongful conduct and
the emotional distress;
(4) The emotional distress must be severe.
The acts of defamation were either intentional or reckless; the acts were
outrageous and likely considered extreme; there was a casual connection
between the conduct and distress; the distress was severe.
The Breach of Confidentiality was an intentional act and reckless; it
disregarded the high likelihood that appellant would overhear the
conversation or be told of the conversation by the classmate; the acts were
outrageous and likely considered extreme; there was a casual connection
between the conduct and distress; the distress was severe.
In noting that the distress was severe, appellant did not need medical etc.
attention. Medical effects are not necessary to it to be actionable however. It
was severe enough to cause severe emotional distress to appellant and

15

appellant could not take the final exam as scheduled. Further there was a
loss of friendship.
See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) f^f 13-20, 22-26, 31-33;
Complaint (Appendix B)fflf13-20, 22-26, 31-33 for the events leading to the
emotional distress.
E. Civil Rights
1.

Appellant does not give up his constitutional rights by attending

appellee's school. The U.S. Supreme court has held:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.
Marsh v. Alabama , 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
2. Unreasonable Seizure - 4 Amend. U.S. Constitution.
While a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment simply
by approaching an individual in a public place and asking him questions, the
individual "need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline
to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way." Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
The U.S. Supreme court has also held:
In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the
defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the
officers1 request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some
16

reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to
determine his identity violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Id., at 52.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210
In each of the unreasonable seizure incidents, appellee was acting
under color of state law. See Amended Complaint (Appendix D) ^ 29 (b),
(c) []; Complaint (Appendix D)ffl[29 (b), (c).
In each incident appellant was detained against his wishes by the
appellee police when no reasonable suspicion or basis for so doing existed.
Further, appellant was singled out for the detainment, asking non-police
BYU employees to report appellant on sight, this in spite of appellant being
a student.
3.

Denial of Equal Protection of Laws

- 14

Amend. U.S.

Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme court has held that a "class of one95 is a
recognizable class Denial of Equal Protection of Laws purposes.
Willowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
Other students similarly situated are not singled out for false
imprisonment, defamatory

articles or have security approach their

classmates and start a character assault on them.

17

Appellant has alleged (or can amend the pleadings) sufficiently to
show that he has been singled out for treatment in the form of torts that
others similarly situated do not suffer. Further the action are done under
color of state law and appellee's employees acting in concert with the state
actor police in bringing about torts and violation of civil rights.
F. FERPA
Appellant injury based on violation of 20 USCS § 1232g, the Family
Education Right to Privacy Act (FERPA) exists. Where an institution of
higher learning receives government assistance either direct or via students
that receive government aid, that institution is required to abide by FERPA.
This means confidential student information can not be given out without the
student's permission. Student disciplinary information is held to be within
the scope of FERPA. See United States v Miami Univ. 91 F Supp 2d 1132
(SD Ohio 2000). (Government was entitled to permanent injunction to
prohibit universities1 future violations of 20 USCS § 1232g, where
government showed that universities had violated statute by releasing
student disciplinary records containing personally identifiable information
without prior consent of students or their parents, since this was only
adequate remedy available and harm to third parties that could arise from
injunction enforcing statute was slight.)
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Appellant has alleged that private disciplinary information about
appellant was given out to others (internet site article, fellow classmate)
without his permission. See Amended

Complaint

\\ 22-26, 31-33; See

Complaint (Appendix B)ffif22-26, 31-33.
These acts are also of greater severity as far as injuring the appellant
in light of the previous false arrest and sexual assault complaint, which was
included in the complaint of the present matter to give greater perspective of
why the preceding torts have caused great emotional and mental trauma to
the appellant.

IV. Trial court missed the Torts issue completely

The trial court in its Ruling (Appendix C) p. 5 states: "Relief from the
harassment of police officers was not a term of the parties' agreement."
Also on p. 5: "In this matter, plaintiff alleges that defendant's failure to
protect him from the harassment of various police officers has denied him
the fruits of the parties' agreement". On p. 6 "The Court has already found
that under the terms of the agreement, defendant had no obligation to protect
plaintiff from the police officer's alleged harassment"). On p. 6 "Plaintiff, in
his complaint, attempts to enlarge and expand the terms of the agreement to
include protection from police harassment."
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The trial court seemed to miss the point that the acts of the appellee
were 1) torts and 2) various other torts were committed by non-police as
tortfeasors, yet the trial court narrows its ruling to police "harassment".
As shown in part III above, the acts are torts (violation of the law)
and not simply "harassment".
The same problem arose in the (second) Ruling (Appendix E)
(denying reconsideration) p. 3: "Plaintiff suggested that this Court employ
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to imply a contractual obligation
on the part of Brigham Young University to insure that BYU Police would
not approach or apprehend plaintiff."
1. That is not what appellant asked the court to do.
2. There is a difference between "approaching or apprehending"
appellant and false imprisoning him or violating the unreasonable seizure
clause of the 4 amend, of the U.S. Constitution. Appellee's police have
done much more than approach or apprehend him. Apprehend seems to
denote that appellant has done something worthy of being arrested.

In

Appellant's complaint, nowhere are there any facts to imply or denote that
appellant did anything worthy of being apprehended or false imprisoned.
Appellant has also shown defamation as a contributing factor to the
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injury to his right to enjoy the contract. When a student's reputation is
damaged in the eyes of fellow peers it harms the educational experience.
3. Further the complaint is not limited to police conduct.

For

example, the Amended Complaint/Complaint sets forth the facts necessary
for causes of action of Defamation
Confidentiality ^

fflf

13-20,22-26; Breach of

31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act

violations ^J 22-26, 31-33 which are attributable to acts by non-police. See
also Complaint (Appendix B) Defamation

| f 13-20,22-26; Breach of

Confidentiality fflf 31-33; Family Education and Right to Privacy Act
violations fflf 22-26, 31-33.

Reference to any of these acts are noticeably

omitted from the Rulings.
Other students similarly situated are not singled out for false
imprisonment, defamatory

articles or have security approach their

classmates and start a character assault on them.
Trail court appears to have read the complaint in a light very favorable
to the appellee.
IV. Trial court missed the Injure element completely
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. has as an element for breach of Good Faith
and Fair dealing either 1) an injury to, or 2) destroying of, a parties right to
receive the benefits of the contract.
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The original Ruling pp. 4-5 states: "Plaintiff did not allege that
defendant has failed to fulfill its obligation under this agreement; plaintiff
has been allowed to enroll in classes." Appellant did not allege a total
breach {destruction) of the contract. Appellant did allege that he has been
injured in the right to receive the fruit of the contract. Under St. Benedictfs
Dev. Co. either a destruction of the right or injury to the right is actionable.
Appellant has alleged injury. The trail court completely omitted the injury
to the right to enjoy the contract element of St. Benedict's Dev. Co.
V. Lack of Administrative Oversight/Deliberate indifference
The other compelling issue regarding the torts committed by the
appellee is the fact that the administration is uninterested and unable to
obviate the torts and their future commission. See Amended Complaint fflf
36-37. See also Complaint (Appendix B) f 36.
This should also support the theory of breach of good faith and fair
dealing.
VI. The case is actionable on the Contract
A cause of action on the contract or in tort can arise for injury
resulting out of contractual relations. See Torts, p. 399-400.
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The facts of this case allow for a cause of action on the contract. This
is especially true as appellant has shown a breach of good faith and fair
dealing.
VII. Amendment of Complaint
Appellant maintains the original complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action on the contract. Appellant's complaint should be considered in a
light most favorable to him and if reasonable inferences are drawn
therefrom, the case should be allowed to proceed.
The amended complaint mainly uses slightly different wording to
characterize the facts to emphasize the validity of the case such as that the
acts of the appellee constituted torts. Two additional false imprisonment
incidents are included - which could be excluded if necessary.
Amending of the complaint could be allowed if a cause of action on
the contract has been shown.

Conclusion & Relief Sought
Appellant's right to the benefits of the contract has been injured.
Appellant has been defamed by appellee on two occasions which damaged
his reputation among the student body and faculty, caused emotional distress
and injured and damaged the fruits of the contract and the enjoyment
thereof.
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Appellant has been singled of by appellee's police for false
imprisonment on numerous occasions. This has injured the right to benefit
from the contract as Appellant does not (and should not) want to suffer tort
against him simply by being on campus.
Appellant has had violation of confidentiality committed by a security
guard who works under the police approaching a classmate, former
roommate and friend in a computer lab and beginning a character attack on
appellant, highly disrupting appellant's ability to study and succeed in his
schoolwork and destroying a friendship.
The administration of appellee is uninterested and unable to prevent
these torts against appellant.
The criteria outlined in for breach of good faith and fair dealing in St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp. is satisfied.
The trial court ruling dismissing the case should be reversed.

Respectfully,

H
DATED yi August, 2003.

Aaron Raiser
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed
n August, 2003 to
<1

General counsel (Brigham Young University)
A-357 ASB
Provo,84602

Appendix A.

Original Contract

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Brigham Young University, #990400300 and"
#990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYU have reached an
agreement to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions:
1.

Raiser and BYU will execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in
the form set forth as Exhibit A to this Agreement.

2.

BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in
2009. BYU will waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and
supplies. If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to
audit the class.

3.

Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees,
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and unknown
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser from
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement.

4.

This agreement is the sole agreement between the parties relating to claims
against one another and all other agreements written and oral are void.

DATED this 28th day of July, 1999.

M

Aaron Raiser

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

//

y if

Alton Wade
Student Life Vice President

Appendix B.

Original Complaint

r
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482 K. 7 Peaks Blvd
ao:
Prove, Utah 84 606
aaron^raiserf^yahoo. cc
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In the Fourth District Court, State of Utah
Complaint

Aaron Raiser
Plaintiff
v,

civil «.o.02tft 03H"-t

Erigham Young University
Defendant

uuaae;

H

Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes
of action alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.

At all times

relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in
Utah County, Sate of Utah.
3.

This Court nas jurisdiction over this matter because

tne amount in controversy exceeds $8,00C, exclusive of costs.
4.

Venue is proper in this county

pursuant to U.C.A.

78-13-4.
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF
Pace 1

5.

On or about 2£ July, 1999, Plaintiff

and Brigham Young University reached an

out-of-court settlement

in cases 990400300 and 990400717 in this court.
6.

See Appendix E.

The basis for the complaints had been extreme misuse

of police authority and power at BYU and abuse and harassment
misusing that authority towards plaintiff.
Breach of Contract
7.

Defendant has breached said contract for

a lack of good faith in providing an atmoshpere
free of abuse and civil rights violations where plaintiff can
attend and concentrate on his studies and not be inflicted with
emotional and mental stress and pain due to illegal activities
of its employees towards plaintiff.
8.

To understand the emotional and mental stress and pain

plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant the court
needs to understand the difficulties plaintiff has had with
defendant in tne"""past."
The facts as alleged in the previous two lawsuits
complaints were not trivial.
9.

If defendant can not accept these

as having merit, the facts alleged can be shown as being true
at court as they relate to the purposes of the present
complaint.
Face 2
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9.

Plaintiff accepted the settlement agreement assuming

that such conduce of the police against plaintiff would cease.
10.

Plaintiff specifically spoke with Hal Visick, BYU

general councel about said conduct and Hal Visick stated he
spoke with the police about the matter and based on the
conversation with BYU general counsel plaintiff felt that
the abuse would stop.

This was also conveyed to plaintiff

by Alton Wade, vice president of student life.
11.

It was somthing plaintiff did not feel necessary

to get in writing concerning the termination of the abuse
on the part of the police as it was somthing they should, by law,
be doing anyway.
12.

Plaintiff also spoke with the President Bateman and he

also conveyed that the ciorcumstances regarding the previous
lawsuits should be forgiven and forgotten and Plaintiff
felt that this meant the police would also take a forgive
and forget approach i.e. treat Plaintiff as any other person
or alumnus.
13.

However, on or about September of 1999, the police

wrote an defamatory article, an article that was admittedly false,
about plaintiff..
14.

Said article appeared in the school's Daily Universe

newspaper.
Page ?
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Said scared that the police had recievec a police

call from a student at Wymount Terrace stating she saw a suspicious
person at the Wymounz chapel.

While the police did not

find plaintiff at the chapel they jumped to the conclusion ir was
him and wrote an article describing the
car plaintiff drives; printed the exact stats
off his drivers license and then proceeded to warn the
reader to aviod this person.
16:, Not everyone shares the opinion of the police regarding
the plaintiff.

For example (plaintiff would prefer not to mention

it but it maybe helps to understand), after a fireside plaintiff
went to speak with president Bateman and the first thing he said
to plaintiff after he introduced himself was that
Eugene Bramhall sure did have a high opinion of plaintiff.
Eugene Bramhall used to be their general counsel.
17.

Plaintiff explained the incident to school president,

Merril Bateman, and he seemed to agree with plaintiff that the
article was without basis and inappropriate.
19.

While not mentioning plaintiff by name, police

admitted they were reffering to plaintiff. Alton Wade,
vice president of student life at the time made the police print
a retraction of the article that appeared in the school paper
on the last day of Winter semester 199S.
20.

This article was defamatory as it was not true
Pace 4

cr^"j4

and enough people wouic have associatec plaintiff witn the person
in m e article ioaseo on the description, inducing two former
members of plaintiff's byu ware.
21.

Tne incioent was extremely traumatice anc emotionally

stressful.
22.

Another defamatory incident occurred on or

about September 2000.
23.

The September 2000 incident occurrea when tne BYU

police gave the Daily Universe false and misleading information
about plaintiff which information got published on the school
newspaper web site and came within 1 hr. of printed publication.
24.

The main falsehood, and there were many, was that

Plaintiff had been convicted of criminal tresspassing at BYU,
said information obtained from the BYU police.
25.

Plaintiff discovered the article prior to

print publication and called Mr. Orme from the general
counsel's office at home at 8 pm or so who had it stopped.
Plaintiff also called Eugene Bramhall from general
counsel's office and Nick Smith, a former Bishop, born having
first hand information that the article was false ano tney also
helped.
26.

The incioent was traumatic for the plaintiff ne

has attended BYU and felt aerired for no genuine purpose
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ana trie article was about tnree full internet pages ana
people from BYU working directly across from plaintiff at r.is
place of employment as a software engineer brought m e school
newspaper to work.
27.

Plaintiff attempted to rake the forgive and forget

approach to the defendant's conduct in (8) - (26).
28.

Plaintiff returned to Brigham Young University

spring of 2002.
29.

Plaintiff was stopped or detained by

BYU police on three occasions without cause.
(a) On or about May 19, 2002, Plaintiff was walking on
campus at about 11:15 pm when he was stopped by a night security
person who said: non students could be en campus as long as they
were not inside the buildings, students could be in the buildings
anytime.

Plaintiff was outside at the time and secerity never

bothered finding out if he was a student or not and called the
police on him for simply walking on campus.

Plaintiff was then

detained by a BYU police officer.
(b)

On or about May 26, 2002 Plaintiff was walking throu

the chemistry building.

Said chemistry building was open and the

hallway was legally accesible by all students.
Plaintiff was sighted by security and
for merely walking through the ouiiaing as a student immediately
hac tne police called on him.
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Fiaintiff could here the person calling on the radio
after passing Plaintiff that he spotted someone looking like
Aaron Raiser and then followed Plaintiff continually
calling police to update his position.
Plaintiff ran out of patience with him and asked him why
he was being followed and then told him he was a student.
A police officer arrived and Plaintiff asked him why this
had happened to him and the officer responded that security
had been instructed to report Plaintiff on sight to the police.
This even though Plaintiff was a student doing nothing
other than being on campus.
(c)

Plaintiff was stopped on June 2, 2002 on the sidewalk

of the chemistry building for as someone reported a person walking
through the chemistry building.
was open.

The chemistry building

This time however after being

stopped the_cf_ficer said iJhat they .had-instructed personnel--to
question anyone not belonging in the area to the police
and report them if they were not chemistry majors etc.
Based on statements of the officer, BYU police had issued an
advisory for chemistry building personnel to specifically
report Plaintiff [or someone similar] to police.
Plaintiff asked police officer if he was being aetained.
Police

Officer said no.

Plaintiff asked if he could leave.
Face

Police

Officer sale no: until tney nac talKec. After talking

and allowing Flaintiff re go a seconc officer ^ept celling
3 or 4 times ic Plaintiff that he was "stuck up".

TLis was cone

in a taunting manner without basis.
30.

Plaintiff gennerally felt singled out and put dov,rn by

security and the police and did not and does not feel
comfortable around them based on the numerous abusive experiences
with them.
31.

On or about 13 June, 2C02, 9:15 pm plaintiff was in

one of the downstairs TMCE computer labs working on homework when
one of the security guard who previously had stopped and
called the police on him without basis came in
and began visiting with another student.
Plaintiff left; security guard continued talking to the
other student who happened to be a former roomate and reasonably
close friend and began telling Plaintiff's friend about
all the things the police dispatch had said
alpout Plaintiff-"itfhen-iie-xeported -Plaintif f
to police and Plaintiff could hear the conversation from
outside the lab, former roomate gasping
in repsonse; security guard having no basis for sharing this
information with former roomate of Plaintiff and now former friend.
32.

The damage did not stop there as tnis friena

was in the same class as Plaintiff and the emotional damage
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and discomfort between the two, and with the
anger Plaintiff felt towards the security
guaro, was such that Plaintiff requested from the instructor
taking the final exam for the class at 3:00 pm outside of class
instead of in class at 5 pm to be able tc concentrate on the exam.
33.

Plaintiff was and is extremely shook up

about the incident.
34.

The forementioned incidents along with the

items in appendix B, Plaintiff beleives there
is extreme animosity on behalf of police department towards
plaintiff.
35.

This is not trivial animosity, it is somthing causing

severe emotinal scarring to the Plaintiff which he can no longer
withstand and plaintiff does not want to risk subjecting recieving
again.
36.

Plaintiff did issue a complaint to two the people over

the police and has heard nothing back from them.

Even if they did

respond Plaintiff has received too many unfulfilled promises
or expectations from previous administrators in the past and
is no longer willing or able tc continue on with tne
settlement agreement and release of appendix A.
37.

Defendant has not excercisec gooc faith

and fair aealing in their part of the agreement.
Pace 9
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38.

The value of the agreement at today's date is

according zc BYU publication:
($214 / credit hour) x 40 credit hour = $8560;
Plaintiff, relying on, and anticipating taking said
classes for career or personal enhancement, if taking said
classes at another university would incur the cost.
39.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
40.

Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a

settlement agreement and release on 28 July, 1999.
41.

Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said

agreement.
42.

Defendant has breached their covenant of

good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said
agreement.
43.

Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to

plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations.
in creating or allowing to exist an atmosphere of
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff can
not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss cf the
value of said contract to the plaintiff.
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44.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - MISREPRESENTATION)
45.

Plaintiff had filed two complaints against defendant

resulting from severe police abuse towards Plaintiff.
46.

Plaintiff did enter into a settlement

agreement and release on 28 July, 1999 with and Defendant
contingent upon a commitment on the part of Defendant that said
police abuse would cease.
47.

Plaintiff specifically asked if said abuse prior to

signing said settlement agreement and was told that it would by
Defendant's general counsel, Hal Visick.
48.

Plaintiff was further told or led to beleive by

the school president and vice president of student life
that both,sides were to take a forgive and forget approach to
the past incidents which also led plaintiff to beleive that
the police abuse would cease.
49.

Said police abuse has not ceased in violation

of plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations,
creating an atmosphere of abuse towards plaintiff;
an atmosphere in which plaintiff can not study
or function free of said abuse; causing a loss of the
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value of said contract to the plaintiff; anc causing a loss of
opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and
obtain damages therefrom.
50.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 4 9 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT)
51.

Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a

settlement agreement and release on 28 July, 1999.
52.

Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said

agreement and as a result did stipulate for dismissal
(with prejudice) cases 990400300 and 990400717.
53.

Defendant has breached their covenant of

good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said
agreement and as a result has BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

Defendant -has -shown- a willful fail-u-re to --respond to
plain, well-understood statuatory or contractual obligations.
54.

Said violation of plain, well-understood statuatory or

contractual obligations has created an atmosphere of
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff
can not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss
of the value of said contract to the plaintiff; and causing
a loss of opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and
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obtain damages therefrom.
55.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained

paragraphs 1 through 54 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF
1.

For Damages of $8560;
OR in the Alternative
For rescision of said contract AND by ORDER of THIS COURT
to permitt the originally settled cases to go to trial;

2.

For costs of suit;

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper under

the curcumstances.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2002.

/f/7^
Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utan
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Aaron Raiser, Pro Se
504 N. 7 Peaks Blvd
Provo, Utah 84606
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Fourth District Court, State of Utah

Aaron Raiser
Plaintiff
v.

Complaint

Brigham Young University
Defendant

Judge: «^/,w S/"

Civil No.

Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes of
action alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.

At all time relevant

hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in Utah County,
Sate of Utah.
3.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because

the amount in controversy exceeds
4.

$20,000, exclusive of costs.

Venue is proper in this county

pursuant to U.C.A.

78-13-7.
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF
5.

On the night of April 18, 1997, at approximatly
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9:50 p.m., Plaintiff was transported to Utah
County Jail under auspices of criminal tresspassing.
6.

Prior to this, Plaintiff was detained by

Brigham Young University police. Police informed Plaintiff
that they received a call of someone standing outside the
Joseph Smith building on campus.
7.
by police.

Plaintiff had ail items removed from his pockets
Upon finding Plaintiff's Driver's lisence

officer, who was later identified as commanding officer,
demanded that Plaintiff recite his Social Security number.
When Plaintiff asked him to get it off driver's lisence,
commanding officer became inflamed.
Plaintiff was also put in handcuff's.

Officers (Four (4) of

them were there) were extremely abusive and angry.

Three

of the four did use profane or swear language,
8.

Plaintiff was asked what he was doing on campus.

Plaintiff told police that it was Sunday and
campus is for church on Sunday and
that his ward meets on campus for church.
He further explained that tithes of members are
to support church facilities for members to attend church
and to worship and that he felt he was using church
facilities for such purposes.
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(At this time plaintiff was off Brigham Young University
property.

Plaintiff had jogged across a busy street bordering

campus and was unaware that police were coming to talk to
him.

Further all police had to do was to say they were there

to talk with Plaintiff before Plaintiff crossed street.)
9.

Police responded angrily that thar wasn't a

sufficient answer and another officer went around plaintiff
and tightened handcuffs.

Officers began yelling at plaintiff

that they weren't playing games.
10.

Plaintiff was told if he didn't tell them what

he was doing on campus he would be taken to jail.
He responded that he already told them.

Officers then

jerked him to police vehicle yelling at him they wern't
playing games.

Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok.

And

again made an attempt to explain what church and Sunday
are for explaining to them that he had full permission
to be on campus for church and church related activities.
11.

An example of church related activity could

be verified by Eugene Bramhall of Brigham Young University
General Counsel who was Plaintiff's Stake President (an
ecclesiastical leader) who travelling to meeting early
one Sunday morning noticed Plaintiff standing by Marriott
Center and stopped to talk.

Plaintiff told him
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that he was preparing for a talk he was to give later
that day (i.e. no noisy roomates on campus).
12.

Officers continued to jerk him once again

to police vehicle angrily yelling they weren't playing games.
Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok. And this time said he
was going for a walk (which many people do there on Sunday,
and can it be understood that people can walk and consider
church/spiritual things at same time).
13.

Officers continued to jerk him once again

to police vehicle angrily yelling they weren't playing games.
Plaintiff responded: ok, ok, ok. And this time said he
was hanging out (which
can it be understood that people can hang out
and consider church/spiritual things at same time).
14. Apparently that satifsied them and they
gently walked plaintiff away from police vehicle.
15.

Plaintiff further told police that he had

permission to attend church on Sunday and chuch related
activities there.
16.

Plaintiff heard radio dispatch person state

that Plaintiff had permission to attend church
and chuch related activities there.
17.

Plaintiff further told/asked police to call his
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bishop, Nicholas Smith of Alpine Utah, to verify this.
Plaintiff also told/asked police to call a reliable source
at Brigham Young University, Eugene Bramhall, who is
General Counsel to the School's President,

that he had

permission to attend church and church related activities
on Sunday and that his ward meets on campus*
18.

Plaintiff further told police

that Dave Thomas, (who working for
Brigham Young University General Counsel and was serving
in an official capacity for Brigham Young University) told
Plaintiff that it was to be left to Plaintiff's "judgement"
as to when he left on Sunday.
19.

According to Plaintiff's chruch's religious

beleifs and doctrine, he was using church
facilities appropriately.
Plaintiff, if he had been dissallowed
to attend church on campus, should have been notified of
any change in permission and been allowed to
conform to such before being sent to jail.
20.

At this point Plaintiff had already had "pat down"

perfomed on him by police.
21.

One officer said to Plaintiff: "How do we know you

are not a pervert".

Plaintiff was then sexually assaulted
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by police officer of Brigham Young University:
Officer performed "second" pat down, this time breifly touching
Plaintiff's upper right arm, upper left arm, then placed his
right hand on Plaintiff's private parts, and with extreme
force pushed on plaintiffs private parts, moved his hand slowly
across plaintiffs private parts pushing with force.

Plaintiff

looked over at officer while his hand was on his private parts
and officer had an expression on his face as if to be feeling
for somthing.
The time officer had his hand directly on plaintiff's
private parts was approximately 4 seconds.
22.

Plaintiff previously has been inproperly

detained in past at Brigham Young University
by seargent Richard Decker who has had a long
running dislike towards Plaintiff and has made his
dislike present to others on Brigham Young University
police.
23.

Plaintiff was told he would be taken to his home

by police, was put in police vehicle and was there by himself
for approximately 5 minutes.- Police then consulted amongst
selves and person/people at police station on campus then
told him he was going to jail.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF
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(WRONGFUL ARREST)
24.

Plaintiff was arrested by Brigham Young University

security and taken to jail for alleged Criminal Tresspassing.
25.

Plaintiff had complete permission to be on campus

Sundays for church and church related activities.

Plaintj

maintains the church institution that
sponsers Brigham Young University has his complete support
that he was using church facilities which his, tithe
supports for appropriate church/religious activity.
Plaintiff was further told by Dave Thomas, who
was speaking in a representative capacity of
Brigham Young University and had
complete autority from Brigham Young University
to speak as such, that it was left
to plaintiff's judgement as to when he left on Sunday.
Brigham Young University security had no legal basis
for taking him to jail. The information that he had
permission to be present
on campus is in direct contradiction of the officer's
surmise that he had no permission to be on campus.
26.

Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently

dismissed at request of Defendant.
27.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in
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paragraphs 1 through 26 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(FALSE IMPRISONMENT)
28.

Plaintiff was arrested by Brigham Young University

security and taken to jail for alleged Criminal Tresspassing.
The Defendant intentionally acted to confine
Plaintiff; Defendant's actions resulted in the jailing of
Plaintiff.
29.

Plaintiff had complete permission to be on campus

Sunday for church and church related activities.

Plaintiff

maintains the church institution that
sponsers Brigham Young University has his complete support
that he was using church facilities which his tithe
supports for an appropriate church/religious activity.
Plaintiff was further told by Dave Thomas, who
was speaking in a representative capacity of
Brigham Young University and had
complete autority from Brigham Young University
to speak as such, that it was left
to plaintiff's judgement as to when he left on Sunday.
Thus, Brigham Young University acted
having no reasonable grounds to take Plaintiff taken to jail.
The information that he had permission to be present
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on campus is in direct contradiction of the officer's
surmise that he had no permission to be on campus.
30.

Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently

dismissed at request of Defendant, who acknowledged that
they had acted, or may have acted inproperly.
31.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 30 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(MALICIOUS PROCECUTION)
32.

Brigham Young University security were aware

they had no basis for his arrest.

In arresting Plaintiff,

Brigham Young University initiated a criminal proceeding against
Plaintiff.
33. Plaintiff was taken to jail
due to malice on behalf of police present and
to directly or indirectlly appease/satisfy
seargent Richard Decker who
has had a long running dislike towards Plaintiff.
34.

Criminal Tresspassing charge was subsequently

dismissed at request of Defendant, who acknowledged that
they had acted, or may have acted inproperly.
cause, based on information in posession
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Probable

of Brigham Young University did not constitute probable
cause for i n i t i a t i n g criminal proceeding against him;
said information contradicting the notion there was
cause for i n i t i a t i n g said criminal proceeding.
35.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 34 above as if set forth in full a t t h i s
point.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(SEXUAL ASSAULT)
36.

Plaintiff had "second" pat down done on him.

37.

The manner in which officer touched Plaintiff's

private parts, the pressure exerted,
the length of time spent doing so
and the fact that officer
said "How do we know you are not a pervert" prior to his action;
such action can in no way be construed as a pat down.
38.

A Citizen has right not to have another person

forcefully impose themselves on onother persons private parts.
39.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)
40.

Plaintiff had "second" pat down done on him.
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41.

The manner in which officer touched Plaintiff's

private parts, the pressure exerted, the
length of time spent doing so
and the fact chat officer
said "How do we know you are not a pervert" prior to his action;
such action can in no way be construed as a pat down.
42.

Constitution of United States of America

protects against unreasonable search and seizure.
43.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 42 above as if sen forth in full at this
point.
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST AND SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF
1.

For Damages of $100,000;

2.

For costs of suit;

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper under

the curcumstances.
ON PLAINTIFFS THIRD CLAIM FOR RELEIF
1.

For Damages of $25,000;

2.

For costs of suit;

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper under

the curcumstances.
ON PLAINTIFFS FOUTH AND FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELEIF
1.

For Damages of $1,500,000;
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2.

For costs of suit;

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper under

the curcumstances.

DATED this 4th day of March, 1999.

Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utah
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Aaron Raiser, Pro Se
504 N. 7 Peaks Blvd
Provo, Utah 84606
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in the Fourth District Court, State of Utah
Aaron Raiser
Plaintiff
v.
Brigham Young university
Defendant

}
}
}
}
}
}

Complaint
Civil No. 990400300
Judge: Burningham

Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes
of action alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.

At all times

relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in
Utah County, Sate of Utah.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because
the amount in controversy exceeds $20,000, exclusive of costs.
4.

Venue is proper in this county

pursuant to U.C.A.

78-13-7.
ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF
5.

In or about the month of June, 1997, Brigham

Young University engaged in slanderous conduct
against Aaron Raiser of Provo, Utah;

Brigham

Young university and it's designated agent(s) having been
informed by Mr. Raiser that the statements they were
making were false.
6.

The statements in question were made to

Chris Mathews of Alpine, Utah, by Mark Gotberg, who was
Page 1
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employeed by Brigham Young University and was acting for
and in behalf of Brigham Young university.
7.

The defamatatory statements are based upon a

falsified police report by the Brigham Young University
police wherein the report accuses Mr. Raiser of tresspassing
on Brigham Young University property,

while such a

falsified report normally would be confidential, a designated
representative of

Brigham Young University

namely Mark Gotberg, disseminated that falsified report
to Mr. Mathews for the purpose of casting Mr. Raiser as
one of questionable character.
8.

The tresspassing claim is from a June 1996

incident at the Brigham Young University.

Job listing

are posted at the Abraham Smoot building.

Alumni are offered

an (written) invitation to use those listings in their persuit
of employement.

A snack room is located next to a

wall with job postings.

A few minutes after entering

the Abraham Smoot building a police officer entered,
and at two times during a supposedly non-police
visit, Mr. Raiser was told that he could remain in
snack room.

The officer then went to the police room and

wrote Mr. Raiser up for tresspassing.
The officer in question on a previous occasion
had falsly accused Mr. Raiser of breaking
into Mr. Raiser's car, was undercover, did not identify
himself or purpose when attempting to question Mr. Raiser
and then could not find his I.D. (at the time) after he
did finnally identify himself. He then
detained Mr. Raiser for about 30 minutes with no legal basis.
9.

Mr. Mathews is a close friend of Mr. Raiser.

has and continues to associate with Mr. Mathews on a
church basis and has dealt with Mr. Mathews on a business
Page 2
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Such false statements have put considerable

strain on the above mentioned relationship and has
cost Mr. Raiser in mental and emotional grief and
could impact any future business dealings he has
with Chris Mathews.
10.

Mr. Raiser has offered witnesses to corraborate

the fact that he was not tresspassing, including a member of
Brigham Young university police.
11.

Such opportunity was rejected.

The school president, Merril Bateman, vice president

Alton wade, and Dave Thomas from the school's legal counsel were
aware what Mr. Raiser had refuted the tresspassing claim.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(DEFAMATION
12.

-- Against Defendant)

Plaingiff incorporates the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 11 above as if set forth in full at this
point.
ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF
1.

For Damages of $125,000;

2.

For costs of suit;

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper under

the curcumstances.
DATED this 1st day of February, 1999.

/M^

Aaron Raiser, Provo, Utah
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Bngham Young Univusity, ^^90400300 and'
^990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYUhivf rnifhrd an
aereeraent to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions:
1.

Raiser and BYU u ill execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in
the form set forth as Exhibit \ to this Agreement.

2.

BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in
2009. BYU w ill waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and
supplies If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to
inulit the class.

3.

Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees,
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and indent wn
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser fie m
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement.

4.

This agreement is the sole agreement bttwttn the parties relating to t iaims
acainst one another and all other agreements written and oral are void.

DATED this 28th day of July, 1999.

dll^

Aaron Raiser

BRIGHAM YjOUNG l^NIVERSITY

V

Alton Wade
Student Life Vice President
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT C
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HE FOURTH

AARON RUSH?.

Ruling
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 020403144

vs.
TK!t : I i A M

:n •

MY

Defendanl
Judse Guv R. Burningham
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and plaintiffs Motion
for Enlargement of Time. Neither party has requested oral arguments on the motions. After
reviewing the file, nieniuraikLu and arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following
ruling.
PROCEDURAL FACTS

-']-)

"uly 25. 2002, plaintiff, Aaron Raiser ("plaintiff'), filed his complaint alleging the

following causes of action:
a. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
b. Breach of contract - misrepresentation
c. Breach of settlement agreement
2

On Septembei 26, 2002, defendant Bri.glia.rii \ oi n lg I Jn.iversi.ty ("defendant") filed a

Motion for Stay Pending Removal.
3, On October 2S\ -002. the Uah Kdeial D^iuU ( ouil i literal an t >'(/f' offiV'unvl^
remanding the case back to this Court.

1

4. On December 4, 2002, defendant filed a Motion to Consolidate Actions asking the
Court to consolidate case no. 020403144 and case no. 020403619. Plaintiff responded to this
motion on December 23, 2002; however, neither party has noticed this motion for decision.
5. The parties presented various discovery issues to the Court which were resolved at
a hearing held on December 13, 2002.
6. On December 23, 2002, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the case pursuant to
Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
7. On January 7, 2002, plaintiff filed a notice of change of address with the Court
stating that his new address is P.O. Box 4870 Ontario, CA 91761.
8. On January 24, 2003, plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time to answer
any pending motions of the defendant.
9.

On February 3, 2003, plaintiff filed his response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

10. On February 11, 2003, defendants filed their reply memorandum.
11. Notice to submit defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed February 15, 2002.
RELEVANT FACTS

On April 28, 1999, the parties in this case executed a Settlement Agreement
("agreement") in which plaintiff agreed to have two cases1, which were pending against defendant
in the Fourth District Court, dismissed with prejudice. In exchange for dismissing the cases,

1

Case numbers 990400300 and 990400717.
2

defendant allowed plaintiff to register and enroll in ten coin ses offered by Bi igham Yc i irig
1 inn fruity nt no expense to the plaintiff. After executing the agreement, both of the cases were
dismissed.
DIM

if MM ON

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

As a preliminary matter. \\w v ;-,urt notes that Jefendaiil dul iuil lik ,111 lijei'tiun to
-'v* :',\T< U/?//,..r /;,/• F/ilarvcmcnt of Time. Therefore, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs motion.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Legal Standard
Defendant has asked this Court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Utah
R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) -failure to state a c^mi \\von

WI^L:*:^:.*.

\• .

u...ii,v

, . .

? ..-

•^ !'- *• • iu • !, int, this Court must "construe the complaint in [a] light most favorable to the
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Mounteer v. L uin 1 \A\ W A L-^-it,
Co , 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 ( I Jtah 1991)

/:

V 1« litionallj , 11 1:1 : tic 1 11 :) dismiss may only be granted

when "there is no set of facts under wliich the [plaintiff] might succeed."

Olson 1. Park-Craig-

Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief— Breach of the Settlement Agreement
In order to sufficiently plead a cLnn iur bundi -i comma. pian.::ii .::ust state tl le
1

•" -.• • 1

1

-•••KM

1 \!<:h\!

'• •' - ^-\c rarty seeking recovery performed under the

3

contract; (3) that the other party breached the contract; and (4) that the non-breaching party
suffered damages. Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20 f 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001).
In this matter, plaintiff claims that various Brigham Young University employees made
oral representations promising plaintiff relief from police harassment. Plaintiff asserts that these
promises were an integral part of the agreement, and that defendant has breached the agreement
by its failure to protect him from police officers' alleged physical, emotional, and sexual
harassment.
When interpreting the terms of an contract, a court must first look within the four
corners of the document to determine its meaning and the intent of the parties. Central Florida
Investment, Inc. v Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3, Tf 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002). Further, "if
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law," and no extrinsic evidence may be introduced to modify the
meaning of the contract. M (internal citations omitted).
The Court has reviewed the parties' agreement and finds that it is clear and unambiguous.
Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff agreed to have two pending suits against defendant
dismissed. In exchange, defendant allowed plaintiff to enroll and audit up to ten courses at the
university

Plaintiff did not allege that defendant has failed to fulfill its obligation under this
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agreement; plaintiff has been allowed to enroll in classes. Kcnci iro;;; ,:ic iiaaissiiient t»l polk c
officers \\iib nul

h'mi I'lhr piirfics1 agreement.

Additionally, the agreement contains an integration clause which states, "This agreement is
the sole agreement between the parties ;.:,:/

. .*•

.:•

:

inilin \\u\ ill ther

agreemenis w i'iit< n and oral are void." Fliis provision establishes that the agreement was fully
integrated, and under the parol evidence rule this Court may not consider ux ^negeu .. UUL ;;^ is
ofthe Brigham

-.ii^. '

^ •-: " •.i,,r!- • i- • >-•-< .!i!'- ihe terms of the agreement - to do so

would be a violation of clear contract interpretation rules. Central Florida 40 P.3d at 605.
Therefore, this Court finals ;l;ai planum i\u< .^.icu ,u >.. f:\
o f c o n : •'. -

!

• *^ *:

:

•- • - - • >>" - < n *' i r e a c h

• rid the Court dismisses plaintiffs third claim for relief

Breach of ihe Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
It..:

v

. nk ' • ' 'J ' ' • •' • '' i '•• *•• .*i covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied

in every contract .S\v 5/, Benedict's Dev. Co, v. Si, Benedict's Hospital. SI1 P.2d !°4 i * iah
1991), Under i; v .iup.iv.c. covenant ot good faith and fair de alii )g " . h \\ !

• '

•

lises

e will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other

party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." ,L;. ... ."

.uhi,

.

•:*' .l\r> *::at

defendant's failure to pmnvt !iim from the harassment of various police officers has denied him.
the fruits of the parties' agreement.
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The Court has already found that under the terms of the agreement, defendant had no
obligation to protect plaintiff from the police officer's alleged harassment. The Utah Supreme
Court has stated that a party's obligations under a contract "cannot be enlarged and expanded by
means of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly
included in the promise actually made." Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951
P.2d 735 (Utah 1997). Plaintiff, in his complaint, attempts to enlarge and expand the terms of
the agreement to include protection from police harassment. As stated above, a party is
precluded from using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to expand his or her
rights under a contract. This is precisely what plaintiff is attempting to do in his first claim for
relief. Because plaintiff has failed to articulate a valid "fruit of the contract" that defendant has
denied him under the agreement, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the Court dismisses
plaintiffs first claim for relief.
Breach of Contract -Misrepresentation
Plaintiff asserts that he entered into the agreement "contingent upon a commitment on the
part of Defendant that said police abuse would cease." (Plaint's Comp. at 11). Plaintiff alleges
that the police have continued to harass him in contravention of the agreement.
After carefully reviewing the terms of the agreement, the Court finds that no assurances,
promises, or obligations were made by either of the contracting parties which would have

6

precluded any police officer from questioning, detaining, or arresting plaintiff

As stated earlier

he ml promises or representations made by any Brigham Young University
employees are not part of the parties' agreement and may n* i :oi...

.

...^

of contract, I'lainiiff cannol i\ 1\ on flic ural statements of Brigham Young I Jniversity employees
as a bases for his claim for relief Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a
r^piv •. n1 • •*

cause of action for brcatn oi c, ;aiau i »: i u

ih _;\, the Court

dismisses plaintiffs second claim for relief
In conch:; ion. the Court finds that thae is no set ol :acis au.gcu .,i , ....
unck. * ...i .s ..L

- • '•••

•,

;

;

;

jt

"M . ::'.T-- <,. ^ nlaint fails to state a cause of action upon which

relief can be granted. Therefore, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this Court DlbM^-: .. plaintiffs complumi a, ^

U;1;*'JL\.

A\. . . dcV^ !:.nt" • * ' ; on to Consolidate is

.v. a ^

he Court orders defendant to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

^^M^M^^UiWlNGl

Case No. 020443144
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Appendix D.

Proposed Amended Complaint

Aaron Raiser, Pro Se
P.O. Box 4870
Ontario, Ca 91761
aaron__raiser@yahoo.com

In the Fourth District Court, State of Utah

Aaron Raiser,

Plaintiff,

}

Amended C o m p l a i n t

}

v.

}
}
Brigham Young University, }
Defendant.
}

Civil No. 020403144
Judge: Burningham

Plaintiff complains against defendant and for causes of action alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County
2. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the
State of Utah. At all times relevant hereto, was authorized to and was doing business in
Utah County, Sate of Utah.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the amount in controversy
exceeds $8,000, exclusive of costs.
4. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to U.C.A. 78-13-4.

ALLEGATIONS RELEVENT TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELEIF
5. On or about 28 July, 1999, Plaintiff and Brigham Young University reached an
out-of-court settlement in cases 990400300 and 990400717 in this court. See Appendix

1

B.
6. The basis for those complaints had been extreme misuse of police authority
and power at BYU and abuse and harassment misusing that authority towards plaintiff.
They complaints covered civil rights violations, false imprisonment, false arrest and
sexual assault. The entire BYU administration was aware of the nature of
these complaints and plaintiff had written both president Bateman and
V.P. Wade stating the nature of the complaints.
Breach of Contract
7. Defendant has breached said contract for a lack of good faith in providing an
atmoshpere free of abuse and civil rights violations where plaintiff can attend and
concentrate on his studies and not be inflicted with emotional and mental stress and pain
due to illegal activities of its employees towards plaintiff.
8. To understand the emotional and mental stress and pain plaintiff has suffered
at the hands of the defendant the court needs to understand the difficulties plaintiff has
had with defendant in the past. The facts as alleged in the previous two lawsuits
complaints were not trivial. See appendix B. These are included as if set forth in full
herein.
9. If defendant can not accept these as having merit, the facts alleged can be
shown as being true at court as they relate to the purposes of the present complaint.
Plaintiff accepted the settlement agreement assuming that such conduct of the
police against plaintiff would cease.
10. Plaintiff did not feel it necessary to get in writing concerning the termination
of the abuse on the part of the police as it was something they should, by law, be doing

2

anyway.
11. Plaintiff specifically spoke with Hal Visick, BYU general counsel about said
conduct and Hal Visick stated he spoke with the police about the matter and based on the
conversation with BYU general counsel plaintiff felt that the abuse would stop. This was
also conveyed to plaintiff after the contract was signed by Alton Wade, vice president of
student life.
12. Plaintiff also spoke with the President Bateman after the contract became
executed and he also conveyed that the circumstances regarding the previous lawsuits
should be forgiven and forgotten and Plaintiff felt that this meant the police would also
take a forgive and forget approach i.e. treat Plaintiff as any other person or alumnus.
13. However, on or about September of 1999, the police wrote a defamatory
article, an article that was admittedly false, about plaintiff.
14. Said article appeared in the school's Daily Universe newspaper.
15. Said stated that the police had received a police call from a student at
Wyoming Terrace stating she saw a suspicious person at the Wyoming chapel. While the
police did not find plaintiff at the chapel they jumped to the conclusion it was him and
wrote an article describing the car plaintiff drives; printed the exact stats off his drivers
license and then proceeded to warn the reader to "use caution around this person".
Enough people could associate plaintiff with the person described in the article, including
two former members of plaintiff s student ward (buy 36th).
16. Plaintiff explained the incident to school president, Merrill Bateman, and he
seemed to agree with plaintiff that the article was without basis and inappropriate.
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17. While not mentioning plaintiff by name, police admitted they were referring
to plaintiff.
18. Alton Wade, vice president of student life at the time made the police print a
retraction of the article that appeared in the school paper on the last day of Winter
semester 1999.
19. This did not cure the original damage as its print date after 3 1/2 months
rendered it meaningless along with it being printed during finals.
20. This article was defamatory as it was not true and enough people would have
associated plaintiff with the person in the article based on the description, including two
former members of plaintiff s byu ward.
21. The incident was extremely traumatic and emotionally stressful. It showed
that the police were definitively out to get and demean plaintiff in the eyes of those that
would read the article. Said police have never resorted to guessing at suspects when
printing their articles. Such conduct is also a denial of equal protection of law as the
police, acting under color of state law, do not do such things to others similarly situated.
22. Another defamatory article was published about plaintiff by the school's
newspaper staff on their internet cite and was to be printed in the Daily Universe
occurred on or about September 2000.
23. The September 2000 incident occurred when the BYU police gave the Daily
Universe false and misleading information about plaintiff which information got
published on the school newspaper web site and came within 1 hr. of printed publication.
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24. The main falsehood, and there were many, was that Plaintiff had been
convicted of criminal trespassing at BYU, said information obtained from the BYU
police. This was defamatory by law.
25. Plaintiff discovered the article prior to print publication and called Mr. Orme
from the general counsel's office at home at 8 pm or so who had it stopped. Plaintiff also
called Eugene Bramhall from general counsel's office and Nick Smith, a former Bishop,
both having first hand information that the article was false and they also helped. The
article was also a sign that the defendant and their police single plaintiff out for such
treatment as others similarly situated are not treated that way. Such conduct is also a
denial of equal protection of law as the police, acting under color of state law, do not do
such things to others similarly situated.
26. The incident was traumatic for the plaintiff he has attended BYU and felt
derided for no genuine purpose and the article was about three full internet pages and
people from BYU working directly across from plaintiff at his place of employment as a
software engineer brought the school newspaper to work. The incident was also a
violation of the Federal Family and Educational Right to Privacy Act.
27. Plaintiff attempted to take the forgive and forget approach to the incidents in
(8) - (26).
28. Plaintiff was also false imprisoned by the defendant on other occasions off
campus.
(a) On or about October, 2000, plaintiff was sitting in his car north of the
horticulture science experimental lot (near 800 N. & 630 E.) and was ordered to give his
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driver's license or face arrest. Plaintiff was told the BYU police can patrol the borders of
their property. Officer could cite no laws being broken.
(b) On or about February, 1998, plaintiff was walking home from work at 1500
W. 800 N. Provo, when a BYU police officer Packer stopped him for the sole purpose of
finding out who he was, citing no laws broken, demanding his name and date of birth or
face having the Provo police called. This was far from BYU property. Officer actions
were done under color of state law. Plaintiff related the incident to then general counsel
Eugene Bramhall who had no idea why the officer had been there.
(c) On or about April, 2002, plaintiff was sitting in his car at the Provo city park
river trail entrance south of the LDS motion picture studio. It was about 11:30 pm and
a BYU officer parked his car directly in back of plaintiff s so he could not go anywhere
and plaintiff asked if he was being detained and officer stated thatplaintiff wasn't going
anywhere, til he identified himself. The area where plaintiff was at was marked as city
property and no curfew etc. existed denying the right to be there at that hour. Officer
could cite no laws being broken. Officer actions were done under color of state law.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the BYU police on that
This conduct is not proper by Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (requiring
police to have an articulated suspicion of a specific crime being committed prior to
requiring a person to give their identification).
29. Plaintiff returned to Brigham Young University spring of 2002 as a student.
Plaintiff was stopped or detained by BYU police on three occasions without cause.
(a) On or about May 19, 2002, Plaintiff was walking on campus at about 11:15
pm when he was stopped by a night security person who said: non students could be on
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campus as long as they were not inside the buildings, students could be in the buildings
anytime. Plaintiff was outside at the time and security never bothered finding out if he
was a student or not and called the police on him for simply walking on campus. Plaintiff
was then detained by a BYU police officer.
(b) On or about May 26, 2002 Plaintiff was walking through the chemistry
building. Said chemistry building was open and the hallway was legally accessible by all
students.
Plaintiff was sighted by security and for merely walking through the building as a
student immediately had the police called on him.
Plaintiff could hear the person calling on the radio after passing Plaintiff that he
spotted someone looking like Aaron Raiser and then followed Plaintiff continually
calling police to update his position.
Plaintiff ran out of patience with him and asked him why he was being followed
and then told him he was a student.
A police officer arrived and Plaintiff was then detained, asked him why this had
happened to him and the officer responded that security had been instructed to report
Plaintiff on sight to the police.
This even though Plaintiff was a student doing nothing other than being on
campus.
(c) Plaintiff was stopped on June 2, 2002 on the sidewalk of the chemistry
building for as someone reported a person walking through the chemistry building. The
chemistry building was open. This time however after being stopped the officer said that
they had instructed personnel to question anyone not belonging in the area to the police
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and report them if they were not chemistry majors etc. Based on statements of the officer,
BYU police had issued an advisory for chemistry building personnel to specifically
report Plaintiff [or someone similar] to police.
Plaintiff asked police officer if he was being detained. Police Officer said no.
Plaintiff asked if he could leave. Police Officer said not until they had talked. After
talking and allowing Plaintiff to go a second officer kept telling 3 or 4 times to Plaintiff
that he was "stuck up". This was done in a taunting manner without basis.
30. Plaintiff generally felt singled out and put down by security and the police
and did not and does not feel comfortable around them based on the numerous abusive
experiences with them. Such incidents amount no false imprisonment and are an
unreasonable seizure. Such detainment also violates the Marsh v. Alabama 326 U.S. 506
holding:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it."
Defendant does open up their property to the public for its benefit for school,
church and related activities.
31. On or about 13 June, 2002, 9:15 pm plaintiff was in one of the downstairs
TMCB computer labs working on homework when one of the security guard who
previously had stopped and called the police on him without basis came in and began
visiting with another student. Plaintiff left; security guard continued talking to the
other student who happened to be a former roomate and reasonably close friend and
began telling Plaintiffs friend about all the things the police dispatch had said about

8

Plaintiff when he reported Plaintiff to police and Plaintiff could hear the conversation
from outside the lab, former roomate gasping in response; security guard having
no basis for sharing this information with former roomate of Plaintiff and now former
friend. Security guard related to his former roomate that plaintiff had been arrested for
lewdness involving a child and that plaintiff had been banned from campus among other
things. There is extreme stigma in hearing someone arrested for something they did not
do
and can otherwise prove, which is the case here. Further the incident amounted to
defamation, putting plaintiff in false light. Plaintiff complained to the V.P. over police
and no action was taken concerning the incident. The incident was also a violation of the
Federal Family and Educational Right to Privacy Act.
32. The damage did not stop there as this friend was in the same class as Plaintiff
and the emotional damage and discomfort between the two, and the anger Plaintiff felt
towards the security guard, was such that Plaintiff requested from the instructor
- taking the final exam for the class at 3:00 pm outside of class instead of in class at 5 pm
to be able to concentrate on the exam.
33. Plaintiff was and is extremely shook up about the incident.
34. The aforementioned incidents along with the items in appendix B5 Plaintiff
believes there is extreme animosity on behalf of police department towards plaintiff.
35. This is not trivial animosity, it is something causing severe emotional
scarring to the Plaintiff which he can no longer withstand and plaintiff does not want to
risk subjecting receiving again. Plaintiff can not study in an atmosphere where the police
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and other employees walk around destroying plaintiffs friendships for no reason; in an
atmosphere where plaintiff is defamed by newspaper articles so other students can hate
plaintiff; where plaintiff is false imprisoned by the police for no legitimate basis at all;
where police incite other students to call the police on him for no reason other than
being on campus as a student breaking no laws.
36. Plaintiff did issue a complaint to two the people over the police and has heard
nothing back from them. Even if they did respond Plaintiff has received too many
unfulfilled promises or expectations from previous administrators in the past and is no
longer willing or able to continue on with the settlement agreement and release of
appendix A.
37. Defendant has not exercised good faith and fair dealing in their part of the
agreement. Said conduct has constituted legal torts committed by defendant as plaintiff
has attempted to enjoy the fruit of the contract. Plaintiff has been injured in his right to
enjoy the fruit of the contract. Plaintiffs right to enjoy the fruit of the contract has been
injured as plaintiff has been injured. The value and worth of the contract is nothing as
plaintiff has to suffer purposeful torts committed against him when he goes to enjoy the
fruits of the contract and the administration does not act to correct the violations of law.
38. The value of the agreement at today's date is according to BYU publication:
($214 / credit hour) x 40 credit hour = $8560;
Plaintiff, relying on, and anticipating taking said classes for career or personal
enhancement, if taking said classes at another university would incur the cost.
39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38
above as if set forth in full at this point.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
40. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a settlement agreement and release on
28 July, 1999.
41. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said agreement.
42. Defendant has breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
fulfilling their part of said agreement.
43. Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to plain, well-understood
statutory and contractual obligations, in creating or allowing to exist an atmosphere of
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff can not study or function free of
said abuse; causing a loss of the value of said contract to the plaintiff by committing torts
such as defamation, false imprisonment, putting plaintiff in false light and injuring his
right to freely enjoy the rights of the contract
44. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43
above as if set forth in full at this point
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF
(BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT)
45. Plaintiff and Defendant did enter into a settlement agreement and release on
28 July, 1999.
46. Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of said
agreement and as a result did stipulate for dismissal
(with prejudice) cases 990400300 and 990400717.
47. Defendant has breached their covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in fulfilling their part of said
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agreement and as a result has BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
Defendant has shown a willful failure to respond to
plain, well-understood statutory or contractual obligations; causing a loss of the value of
said contract to the plaintiff by committing torts such as defamation, false imprisonment,
putting plaintiff in false light and injuring his right to freely enjoy the rights of the
contract.
Said violation of plain, well-understood statutory or
contractual obligations has created an atmosphere of
abuse towards plaintiff; an atmosphere in which plaintiff
can not study or function free of said abuse; causing a loss
of the value of said contract to the plaintiff; and causing
a loss of opportunity to litigate cases 990400300 and 990400717 and
obtain damages therefrom.
48. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 47 above as if set forth in full at this point.

ON PLAINTIFFS FIRST AND SECOND CLAIM FOR RELEIF

1. For Damages of $8560;
OR in the Alternative
For rescission of said contract AND by ORDER of THIS COURT
to permit the originally settled cases to go to trial;
2. For costs of suit;
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper under
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the circumstances.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2003.
Aaron Raiser
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Appendix A

1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

Aaron Raiser has filed two lawsuits against Brigham Young University, #990400300 and #990400717 in the Fourth District Court in the State of Utah. Raiser and BYU have reached an
agreement to settle these cases on the following terms and conditions:
1.

Raiser and BYU will execute and file stipulations for dismissal of the lawsuits in
the form set forth as Exhibit A to this Agreement.

2.

BYU will permit Raiser to register to audit up to a total often courses offered by
BYU in the Spring or Summer term of any year starting with 2000 and ending in
2009. BYU will waive all tuition costs, but Raiser will pay for books and
supplies. If a course Raiser wishes to audit is filled prior to his registration, BYU
shall have no obligation to increase enrollment to accommodate Raiser's desire to
audit the class.

3.

Raiser hereby releases BYU from all claims and causes of action of every kind
whatsoever he has or may have against BYU, its employees, officers and trustees,
including but not limited to the claims and causes of action embodied in the
lawsuits described above. This Release includes all claims, known and unknown
existing on the date of this agreement. BYU hereby releases Aaron Raiser from
all claims and causes of action it has or may have against him. This Release
includes all claims known and unknown on the date of this agreement.

4.

This agreement is the sole agreement between the parties relating to claims
against one another and all other agreements written and oral are void.

DATED this 28th day of July, 1999.

M

Aaron Raiser

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

Alton Wade

1/ Student Life Vice President

Appendix B
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Appendix E.

Second Ruling Dismissing Case

\-TLtzU

Fourth Juacfc! District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH
Ruling

AARON RAISER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 020403144

vs.

DATE: May 22, 2003

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,

Judge Burningham

Defendants.

The matter is before the Court on plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs Motion
to Amend Complaint. The Court having reviewed the file, memoranda and being duly informed
therefrom, enters the following ruling.
Procedural History
1. On March 17, 2003, plaintiff Aaron Raiser ("plaintiff) filed a Motion to Amend
Complaint.
2. On March 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider.
3. On March 21, 2003, plaintiff filed a second Motion to Amend Complaint.
4. On March 31, 2003, plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Amend Complaint.l
5. On March 31, 2003, defendant, Brigham Young University, filed its Memorandum in

1

Plaintiff filed three motions to amend. In the interest of efficiency, all three motions to
amend will be dealt with as one motion.

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
6. On April 1, 2003, defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Amend
Complaint?
7. On April 17, 2003, plaintiff filed an Objection to Order as Drafted?
8. On April 17, 2003, plaintiff filed a Response Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider.
9. On April 28, 2003, defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Order.
10. On May 9, 2003, plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Reply Regarding the
Proposed Order.
11. Notice to submit plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and plaintiffs Motion to Amend
Complaint was filed on April 28, 2003.
Discussion
Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiffs original complaint was dismissed by this Court for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A trial court may deny a motion to amend a
pleading when (1) it is filed after extensive delay, (2) it is filed without adequate justification,

2

Brigham Young University addressed plaintiffs various motions to amend in one
combined memorandum.
3

Plaintiffs Objection to Order as Drafted will be considered as part of the Motion to
Reconsider section of this ruling.
2

and (3) after some of the issues have been resolved. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56
P.3d 524 (Utah 2002).
First, the proposed Amended Complaint does not cure the deficiencies of the original
complaint, nor does it raise new issues which were unknown to plaintiff at the time he filed his
original complaint. Assuming the new issues raised by plaintiff in his proposed Amended
Complaint were unknown to plaintiff at the time, they would not change the outcome of this
case. The new factual allegations were simply additional episodes of "police harassment"
completely consistent with the factual allegations stated in the original complaint. Regardless of
how the Court construes these factual allegations, they do not prove breach of contract on the
part of Brigham Young University. Therefore, the Motion to Amend Complaint is not adequately
justified.
Second, any new allegations were not timely filed in a complaint. The most recent of
plaintiffs new allegations occurred an entire year before plaintiff filed this Motion to Amend
Complaint. This Court has the discretion to refuse to accept the amended Complaint after such
an extensive delay. Further, it would be prejudicial to Brigham Young University to have to
defend this complaint because no new cause of action is stated and the additional allegations are
factually similar to those already alleged and are insufficient to prove a breach of contract.
Third, the issues in this case have been resolved. Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed and
it is not in the interest of fairness or justice for the Court to revisit these issues.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint.
Motion to Reconsider
A Motion to Reconsider is not provided for in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "and has
never been recognized as a proper motion in this state." Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 340, 342
(Utah 1980) (citations omitted). Plaintiff cited to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e)
as the procedural support for his Motion to Reconsider. Therefore, the Court will consider this
motion as a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Grounds for an
amended judgment are irregularity in the proceedings of the court, misconduct of the jury,
accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict, or an error in law. Utah R.Civ.P. 59. In this case there
were no irregularities in the proceedings. There was no jury and therefore no misconduct of the
jury. There was no accident or surprise. As stated before, the new evidence presented is not
material to this claim and could have been, with due diligence, discovered and presented to the
Court before the complaint was dismissed. There is no issue as to excessive or inadequate
damages because this case was dismissed at the pleadings stage. Finally, there was no error in
law. As a matter of law, plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs Good Faith and Fair Dealing Argument
Plaintiffs claim that the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing was breached is
duly noted. Plaintiff suggested that this Court employ the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
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to imply a contractual obligation on the part of Brigham Young University to insure that BYU
Police would not approach or apprehend plaintiff. However, a party's obligations under a
contract "cannot be enlarged or expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually made." Jensen
v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735 (Utah 1997). Despite plaintiffs argument
that the fact pattern of Jensen does not apply, the legal proposition for which it stands is good
law and does apply to this case.
Plaintiffs Objection to the Order
Plaintiff further objected to the April 4, 2003 Order because "opposing counsel []
attempted] to slip in two extra words - page 2 line 2 [-] that disallow plaintiff to pursue justice."
The Court must assume plaintiff was referring to the words "with prejudice." The complaint was
dismissed pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). Under Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), an involuntary
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is assumed to be with prejudice unless the court specifies
otherwise. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1997). The Court did not specify
whether the dismissal was with prejudice and, therefore, the assumption that it was with
prejudice was properly made.
Plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P
12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The proposed
Order reflected that holding and this Court DENIES plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
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Dated at Provo, Utah this ZZday of May, 200:
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